Abstract
“Turkish Jews in an unwelcoming public space” focuses on the transformation of citizenship experiences and daily life practices of Turkish Jews in the last decade. I argue that Turkish Jews’ feelings of insecurity have intensified as consequence of the rising religious conservatism under subsequent AKP governments. This sense of insecurity has become even more acute with the rise of anti-Semitism especially after the 2013 Gezi Park Protests and the July 15 coup attempt in 2016. In this chapter, I discuss the main strategies and performative repertoires that Turkish Jews have adopted in response to this adversarial social and political environment.
I would like to thank Betsy Penso and Eli Haligua for their valuable contributions. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewer, as well as İpek Yosmaoǧlu and Kerem Öktem for their careful readings and acute criticisms that I benefited from in various drafts.
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Notes
- 1.
In common Turkish parlance, the term minority refers only to Jews, Greeks , and Armenians as they are mentioned in the Treaty of Lausanne. It leaves out all Muslim minorities, as well as the Syriac Christians.
- 2.
In fact, the deterioration of basic rights in Turkey did not occur in an abrupt shift around 2013. The European Union Commission’s 2006 Progress Report contains a powerful critique on Turkey’s failure to live up to standards of democratic governance and human rights. See EU Commission, Turkey 2006 Progress Report. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/tr_sec_1390_en.pdf. For further reading, see Karabekir Akkoyunlu and Kerem Öktem, “Existential Insecurity and the Making of a Weak Authoritarian Regime in Turkey” in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16, no.4 (2016): 505–527.
- 3.
Founded by Fetullah Gülen, an Islamic preacher from eastern Turkey after the 1980 military coup, the movement, often referred to as Hizmet (service), has established a network of schools, businesses, civil society organizations, and media outlets in Turkey and globally. The Hizmet movement was particularly influential in the judiciary and the military.
- 4.
Onur Bakıner, “How Did We Get Here? Turkey’s Slow Shift to Authoritarianism,” in Authoritarian Politics in Turkey, eds. Bahar Başer, Ahmet Erdi Öztürk (London & New York: I.B. Taurus: 2017), 22. M. Hakan Yavuz and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, “Turkish Secularism and Islam under the Reign of Erdoğan” in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 19, no. 1 (2019): 1–9.
- 5.
Demet Lüküslü, “Creating a Pious Generation: Youth and Education Policies of the AKP in Turkey” in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16, no. 4 (2016): 637–649.
- 6.
Cenk Saraçoğlu and Özhan Demirkol, “Nationalism and Foreign Policy Discourse in Turkey under the AKP Rule: Geography, History and National Identity” in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 3 (2015): 301–319.
- 7.
For a fruitful further reading see Umut Uzer, “Conservative Narrative: Contemporary Neo-Ottomanist Approaches in Turkish Politics” in Middle East Critique (2020): https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2020.1770444. Uzer also tackles Necip Fazıl Kısakürek’s anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in his article.
- 8.
This information was obtained from Chief Rabbinate of Turkey in May 2020. I am withholding the name of the interviewee due to privacy.
- 9.
Information obtained from one of the prominent leaders of the Jewish community in December 2019. I am withholding the name of the interviewer due to privacy.
- 10.
Özgür Kaymak and Anna Maria Beylunioglu, İstanbul’un Rum, Yahudi ve Ermeni Toplumlarında Karma Evlilikler (Mixed Marriages in Rum, Jewish and Armenian Communites of Istanbul) (Istanbul: Istos, 2020).
- 11.
The government has taken several actions and initiated public debates regarding the place of religion in the country, particularly in the cultural, economic, and educational spheres. Since 2002, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), an office that reports to the prime minister and has a budget larger than many ministries, plays an increasingly significant role in both state and the society. Furthermore, the number of Qur’an courses has risen dramatically. Religious lessons remain compulsory in the curriculum of primary and secondary schools. The importance of high schools with a religious curriculum (Imam-Hatip) has also grown. See: Emrah Çelik, “Power and Islam in Turkey: The Relationship Between the AKP and Sunni Islamic Groups, 2002–16” in Authoritarian Politics in Turkey, eds. Bahar Başer, Ahmet Erdi Öztürk (London & New York: I.B. Taurus: 2017): 113.
Dr. Toprak argues that rising social conservatism in Turkey is creating an environment of discrimination against secular and liberal Turks, particularly women. According to Toprak, it is not religiosity that is ascendant in Turkey, but rather social conservatism. See (https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/political-power-and-social-conservatism-in-turkey).
- 12.
A major part of the Istanbul Jewish community maintains a secular lifestyle. In a meeting with a representative of the Turkish Jewish community in December 2019, it was stated that the Jews who live according to religious requirements in Turkey––observing Shabbat, abiding by rules of kashrut, regularly attending synagogue on Saturdays––constitute no more than five percent of the total population.
- 13.
The term “non-Muslim communities/minorities” refers to the Rum, Jewish, and Armenian communities. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) established the legal basis of religious minority rights in Turkey and is still technically valid today. With the founding of the Republic, despite the ostensible aims of a secular state, minorities were defined according to their religious identity and, accordingly, felt excluded from the national identity. They remained second-class citizens as was the case in the Ottoman Millet system. Under the Millet system, people of different religions coexisted and were tolerated under the superiority of Islam. This definition of tolerance is limited to the acceptance of Sunni Muslims’ supremacy under the banner of the Sunni-Muslim-Turkish nation. In the end, toleration in the Ottoman context, as in other imperial settings, refers to the “absence of persecution of people but not their acceptance in the society as full and welcomed members of community.” Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 110.
- 14.
In the early years of the Republic the reflection of the state-centric modernization project was imposed on non-Muslim communities within Turkey, through various cultural, economic, and political practices. The impetus behind these policies was to create a homogeneous society in which Sunni-Muslimness was defined as main marker of ‘being Turkish.’ Apart from such Turkification/anti-minority politics in the 1970s and 80s, non-Muslims experienced many extrajudicial practices which limited their civil and religious freedoms. For socio-historical background studies of Jewish, Rum, and Armenian communities, see Ayhan Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları [The Capital Tax and Turkification Policies], 11th ed. (Istanbul: İletişim, 2012); Anna Maria Aslanoğlu, Foti Benlisoy, Rigas Haris, İstanbul Rumları Bugün ve Yarın [Rums of Istanbul, Today and Tomorrow] (Istanbul: İstos, 2012); Rıfat N. Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923–1945) [Turkish Jews in the Republican Period: An Adventure of Turkification] 7th ed. (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005). Marcy Brink-Danan, Yirmi Birinci Yüzyılda Türkiye’de Yahudiler, Hoşgörünün Öteki Yüzü [Jews in Turkey in the Twenty-First Century, the Other Face of Tolerance], trans. Barış Cezar (Istanbul: Koç University Publications, 2014). Lerna Ekmekçioğlu, Recovering Armenia, The Limits of Belonging in Post-Genocide Turkey (California: Stanford University Press, 2016).
Özgür Kaymak, İstanbul’da Az(ınlık) Olmak: Gündelik Hayatta Rumlar, Yahudiler, Ermeniler [Being a Minority in Istanbul: Rums, Jews and Armenians in Daily Life] (Istanbul: Libra, 2017).
Özgür Kaymak and Anna Maria Beylunioglu, “An Analysis of National and Minority Identity Relationality: The Case of Antiochian Eastern Orthodox Community in Istanbul” in Poligrafi, Islam and Democracy 85–86, no.22 (2017): pp. 65–87.
Nazan Maksudyan, “Üç kuşak üç katliam: 1894’den 1915’e Ermeni çocuklar ve yetimler” [Three Generations, three massacres: Armenian children and orphans from 1894 till 1915] in Toplum ve Bilim, no. 132 (2015).
Rasel Meseri and Aylin Kuryel, Türkiye’de Yahudi Olmak Bir Deneyim Sözlüğü [Being a Jew in Turkey: A Dictionary of Experience] (Istanbul: İletişim, 2017).
Leyla Neyzi, “Ben Kimim?” Türkiye’de Sözlü Tarih, Kimlik ve Öznellik [“Who am I?” Oral History, Identity and Subjectivity in Turkey] 5.th ed, (Istanbul: İletişim, 2013).
- 15.
For recent works on the subject of anti-Semitism in Turkey see: Rıfat N. Bali, Komplo Teorileri Cehaletin ve Antisemitizmin Resm-i Geçidi [Conspiracy Theories and Parade of Antisemitism] (Istanbul: Libra, 2016); Rıfat N. Bali, Toplu Makaleler-2 Türkiye’de Antisemitizm ve Komplo Kültürü [Collected Articles-2 Antisemitism in Turkey and Conspiracy Theories] (Istanbul: Libra, 2013).
Rifat N. Bali, A Scapegoat for All Seasons: The Dönmes or Crypto-Jews of Turkey (Istanbul: ISIS, 2008).
Rıfat N. Bali, “Aliya” Türk Yahudilerinin İsrail’e Göç Hikayeleri [“Aliya”: The Stories of Turkish Jews Migration to Israel] (Istanbul: Libra, 2008).
Kerem Karaosmanoğlu, Komplo Teorileri Disiplinlerarası Bir Giriş [Conspiracy Theories, An Interdisciplinary Introduction] (Istanbul: Iletişim, 2019).
Türkay Salim Nefes, “Understanding the anti-Semitic Rhetoric in Turkey through the Sevres Syndrome” in Turkish Studies 16, no. 4 (2015): 572–587.
Türkay Salim Nefes, “Scrutinizing Impacts of Conspiracy Theories on Readers’ Political Views: A Rational Choice Perspective on anti-Semitic Rhetoric in Turkey” in British Journal of Sociology 66, no. 3 (2015): 557–575.
Türkay Salim Nefes, “Political Parties’ Perceptions and Uses of anti-Semitic Conspiracy Theories in Turkey” in The Sociological Review, no. 61 (2013): 247–264.
Türkay Salim Nefes, “Conspiracy Theory Culture in Turkey and the “Crypto-Jews”: Dönmes”, Moshe Dayan Center, Turkeyscope, April 2019, https://dayan.org/content/conspiracy-theory-culture-turkey-and-crypto-jews-donmes.
Marc David Baer, The Dönme Jewish Converts, Muslim Revolutionaries, and Secular Turks (California: Stanford University Press, 2010).
- 16.
Due to the sensitivity of the topic at hand, instead of using the names of individuals, I use a coding method commonly found in similar qualitative studies (Age, W: Woman, M: Men). Because of the confidentiality principle, I have personally transcribed the conversations that I recorded.
- 17.
“Timeline of Gezi Protests”, in Gezi Park Protests: Brutal Denial of the Right to Peaceful Assembly in Turkey (London: Amnesty International, 2013), 54–58.
- 18.
For more information on the Gezi protests see: Mehmet Barıs Kuymulu, “Reclaiming the Right to the City: Reflections on the Urban Uprising in Turkey” in City 17, no. 3 (2013), 247–248.
- 19.
Çelik, “Power and Islam in Turkey,” 113.
- 20.
These are common Jewish and Turkish women’s names.
- 21.
“Erdoğan neden üç çocuk istediğini açıkladı” [Erdogan explains why he wants three children], Milliyet, January 2, 2013, accessed: 21 June 2020: https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/erdogan-neden-3-cocuk-istedigini-acikladi-1650260.
- 22.
Bakıner, “How Did We Get Here?” 42.
- 23.
After July 2016, the new school curriculum introduced ‘15 July victory of democracy’ as a new subject for various grades.
- 24.
The Governorate of Istanbul banned the 2016 International Women Day Parade on March 8 and the LGBT Pride held in June, due to security reasons. Despite the ban and the police blockade in Taksim Square, women were again on the streets this year for their rights.
“8 Mart Feminist Gece Yürüyüşü: Kadınlar yasağa rağmen yürüdü” (March 8 Feminist Night March: Women marched despite the bans), Evrensel, March 8, 2020, accessed: June 24, 2020: https://www.evrensel.net/haber/398977/8-mart-feminist-gece-yuruyusu-kadinlar-yasaga-ragmen-yurudu.
- 25.
Bali,“Aliya” Türk Yahudilerinin İsrail’e Göç Hikayeleri.
Kaymak and Beylunioglu, “An Analysis of National and Minority Identity.”
- 26.
Bali,“Aliya” Türk Yahudilerinin İsrail’e Göç Hikayeleri.
- 27.
“Turkey,” Anti-Defamation League, January 14, 2016: https://global100.adl.org/country/turkey/2014. The Index Score represents the percentage of adults in this country who answered “probably true” to a majority of the anti-Semitic stereotypes tested.
- 28.
Karel Valansi, “Ira Forman: “Yükselen Antisemitizmden” [Ira Forman: We are worried about rising anti-Semitism], Şalom , June 11, 2014: http://www.salom.com.tr/haber-91384-ira_forman__yukselen_antisemitizmden_endiseliyiz_.html.
ADL’s “Global Anti-Semitism: Select Incidents 2019” report mention two anti-Semitic incidents from Turkey. First, in Istanbul, a Turkish Islamist newspaper published an anti-Semitic report claiming that Jews living in the Beykoz district have taken control of the neighborhood, training dogs to bite Muslim inhabitants. Jewish commentators said that the rhetoric has contributed to anti-Semitism. Second, in Izmir, an unidentified attacker threw a firebomb at the Beth Israel Synagogue. He told police that he attacked the synagogue to protest Israel.
“Global Anti-Semitism: Select Incidents in 2019,” Anti-Defamation League, accessed April 7, 2020: https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/global-anti-semitism-select-incidents-in-2019.
- 29.
Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2008).
- 30.
Eli Haligua, “Toplumun 31,7%’si Musevi komşu istemiyor” [31.7% of the society do not want a Jewish neighbor], Avlaremoz, February 2, 2018, accessed: June 10, 2018: http://www.avlaremoz.com/2018/02/02/toplumun-17si-musevi-komsu-istemiyor-2/.
- 31.
The Foundation was established after the assassination of Armenian intellectual, public figure Hrant Dink in 2007. Hrant Dink Foundation has been conducting the project titled “Media Watch on Hate Speech” since 2009. See: https://hrantdink.org/tr/asulis/faaliyetler/projeler/medyada-nefret-soylemi/2134-medyada-nefret-soylemi-mayis-agustos-2019-raporu-yayimlandi, accessed: 7 April 2020; and “Medyada Nefret Söylemi İzleme Raporu, Ocak-Nisan 2018” [The Hate Speech Monitoring Report in the Media, January-April 2018], accessed: 3 June 2018: https://hrantdink.org/attachments/article/1356/Medyada%20Nefret%20Söylemi%20İzleme%20Raporu%20Ocak-Nisan%202018.pdf.
- 32.
On May 31, 2010, Israeli forces boarded the Turkish ship, the Mavi Marmara , which was part of a flotilla carrying supplies to Gaza. Nine people on the ship were killed in the ensuing violence.
- 33.
In July 2014 people gathered in order to protest the Israeli bombardment on the sidewalk right across the Ortaköy Etz Ahayim Synagogue while the protestors shouted “baby murderer Israel” and threw eggs at its wall.
- 34.
In a historical fiction television series named “Payitaht” on a Turkish state television channel, Jews were portrayed attempting to assassinate the thirty-fourth sultan, Abdul Hamid II, and Zionist leader Theodor Herzl was depicted as tricking the Sultan into founding the State of Israel.
- 35.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told a meeting of local elected officials that “the famous Hungarian Jew Soros” was behind an individual who “financed terrorists” during the nationwide anti-government protests of 2013. In Turkish Islamist thinking, interest rates are a tool employed by Jews to control world events, as stated by Erdogan’s political mentor, former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan.
Aykan Erdemir and John A. Lechner, “Erdogan’s Anti-Semitism will sink Turkey’s Economy” Foreign Policy, December 24, 2018, accessed: 7 April 2020: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/24/erdogans-anti-semitism-will-sink-turkeys-economy.
- 36.
Many conspiracy theories with anti-Semitic comments that Fettullah Gülen is Jewish appeared especially in the right-wing, conservative, and Islamist-leaning press.
“Karay Yahudisi Fettullah Gülen” [A Karay Jew Fettullah Gülen], Sabah, December 28, 2016, https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/bolgeler/ramoglu/2016/12/28/karay-yahudisi-fetullah-gulen; “Yeni Şafak yazarı: Yahudiler Fethullah Gülen’e “Mesihimizsin” demiş, annesinin gerçek adı Rabin” [The Jews told Fethullah Gülen, “You are our Messiah.” His mother’s real name is Rabin], August 23, 2016: https://t24.com.tr/haber/yeni-safak-yazari-yahudiler-fethullah-gulene-mesihimizsin-demis-annesinin-gercek-adi-rabin,356437; “Kadir Mısıroğlu: Gülen babadan ermeni anneden yahudidir” [Gülen’s father is Armenian and his mother is Jewish], February 3, 2019, https://www.internethaber.com/kadir-misiroglu-gulen-babadan-ermeni-anadan-yahudidir-video-galerisi-1578386.htm.
For a recent analysis about anti-Semitism in Turkey, see Efrat Aviv, “Antisemitism Worldwide General Analysis, 2018” (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Kantor Center, 2018).
- 37.
According to a recent survey commissioned by Kadir Has University, after the United States, Israel ranks second among the countries perceived as posing a threat to Turkey.
“Turkish foreign policy public perceptions survey 2020”, Kadir Has Üniversitesi, https://www.khas.edu.tr/en/node/6098.
- 38.
For a dramatic interview regarding being a young Jew in Turkey see.
“Istanbul is My Home, but it is Over,” +90. June 12, 2020. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9qJeiWIsxtA, 12 June 2020.
- 39.
The Iberian “right to return” topic was not mentioned exclusively by the respondents within the scope of this fieldwork. According to another study done by the author, most Turkish Jews applied for or received passports from Spain and Portugal. While the common cause is fear regarding their future in the country, practical reasons such as European residence permits and visa-free travel in Europe afforded by Spanish or Portuguese citizenship have also been influential in this choice. See Kaymak, “Turkish Jews’ Perspectives on Israel.”
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Kaymak, Ö. (2022). Turkish Jews in an Unwelcoming Public Space. In: Öktem, K., Yosmaoğlu, I.K. (eds) Turkish Jews and their Diasporas. Modernity, Memory and Identity in South-East Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87798-9_10
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